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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6358  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1798  
RUEHKF/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 7423  
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Friday, 21 September 2007, 10:08

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004085

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EO 12958 DECL: 09/20/2017

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK

SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS DEPUTY SECRETARY PAKISTAN IS

COMMITTED TO FIGHT AL QAEDA, TALIBAN

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

11. (C) Summary. During a September 13 meeting with the Deputy Secretary, President Musharraf reiterated his intention, absent intervention by  
12. (C) The Deputy Secretary, accompanied by Ambassador, SCA Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, and S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey met President  
Re-Election Scenario

13. (C) Musharraf said that he expected XXXXXXXXXXXX in attempting to disqualify Musharraf as a candidate. He said that he could be re-elected  
14. (C) On the deportation of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Deputy Secretary noted that the administration understood what had happen  
15. (C) Musharraf said that after the elections, it would be important to include Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) leader Fazlur Rehman in the gove  
Afghanistan/India

16. (C) Negroponte noted the successful trilateral meeting he hosted on September 11 for Pakistan and Afghan Presidential Advisors Tariq Aziz a  
17. (C) Musharraf said he agreed and will go ahead with selecting Pakistan's group of 25 for the sub-jirga; these should be the "right" people  
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Musharraf, was the Afghan recognition that they needed to talk to the "opposition," and this would be more successful with a smaller sub-jirga  
18. (C) Musharraf asked the U.S. to intervene on one issue of real concern--the "deliberate" attempt of Kabul and New Delhi to destabilize Balc  
FATA: Al Qaeda, Taliban, Extremism Are Different Problems

19. (C) Negroponte noted that he had just received Embassy Islamabad's briefing on our plans to support the GOP integrated security and develop  
110. (C) Musharraf outlined the differing threats of al Qaeda, the Taliban and extremism. These, he asserted, were three distinct issues that t  
111. (C) Turning to the Taliban, Musharraf said this was a different issue. Pakistan could fight al Qaeda with troops, but the Taliban were bei  
112. (C) Musharraf described extremism in Pakistani society as yet another facet of the challenge, and this required

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changing mindsets. He had attacked the problem in several ways. The GOP had increased control over mosques, banning loudspeakers, collection pl  
113. (C) Musharraf thanked the U.S. for approving the five-year \$750 million plan for FATA projects but said that the projects and ROZs had not  
F-16s: Don't Violate Our Deal

114. (C) In closing, Musharraf said that the Pakistan Air Force was upset over what they felt was the U.S. undermining "by design" the agreemer

115. (U) The Deputy Secretary's staff has cleared this message.

PATTERSON